The Global Positioning System and Military Jamming: The geographies of electronic warfare by Westbrook, Tegg
Journal of Strategic Security 
Volume 12 Number 2 Article 1 
The Global Positioning System and Military Jamming: The 
geographies of electronic warfare 
Tegg Westbrook 
University of Stavanger, teggwestbrook@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss 
pp. 1-16 
Recommended Citation 
Westbrook, Tegg. "The Global Positioning System and Military Jamming: The 
geographies of electronic warfare." Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 2 
(2019) : 1-16. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.2.1720 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized 
editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu. 
1 
Introduction  
The Global Positioning System (GPS) “is a satellite-based navigation system 
comprised of a network of orbiting satellites that provide location and time 
information, anywhere on or near the Earth.”1 First launched in the 1980s, GPS 
satellites became fully operational in 1993, and were available for civilian use in 
1995. These satellites were first used by the United States military for providing 
precision navigation and timing. Over recent decades, free-to-use GPS has 
improved considerably in accuracy and reliability, and now it is difficult to find 
any civilian or military infrastructure that is not in some way dependent on it.  
 
Not only is GPS used to aid navigation in vehicles, it supports critical 
infrastructure by synchronizing a wide range of computer-based systems, 
including for law enforcement, emergency services, transportation, 
communications, electrical power grids, and financial transactions, amongst 
many others. It boosts productivity in many sectors, enabling precision 
timing for synchronization, algorithmic decision-making, and operational 
efficiency.2 For all these reasons, it is important that GPS data is available 
and reliable.3 
 
What is Jamming and Spoofing? 
 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has called the GPS “a single point of 
failure for critical infrastructure.”4 This is, in part, due to the fact that the vast 
majority of GPS receivers need to be very sensitive because of the weak signals 
coming from distant, orbiting satellites. This weakness creates many 
opportunities for criminals as well as state actors seeking military strategic gains.  
 
Jamming is caused by “the transmission of a noise signal across one or more of 
the GPS frequencies to raise the noise level or overload the receiver circuitry and 
cause a loss of lock.”5 Jammers vary in power and capability, and these are 
factors that play into end-user intentions. As this article highlights, jamming is 
used to block GPS-enabled tracking. It can also be used for harassment, or to 
disorientate navigation and positioning information. Jamming is often 
indiscriminate and causes both intentional and unintentional disruption that 
transcends borders and penetrates walls and systems. 
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There are various methods and intentions for interfering with GPS information. 
Spoofing ‘is the act of producing a falsified version of the GPS signal with the goal 
of taking control of a target.6 It could also include introducing a false time signal 
into electrical control systems and causing equipment malfunction and damage.7 
Counter-jamming technologies, usually built into systems and structures, are 
designed to identify when jamming occurs, identify the locations of jamming, 
trigger backup systems, or simply ignore or overcome interference. It is not 
within the scope of this article to explore counter-jamming technologies, 
however. 
 
Interference of the GPS system is therefore an issue that is of concern to a range 
of actors, including the military, critical infrastructure owners, and aerial, 
maritime and road transport sectors, with potential economic and political 
consequences, and threat to life. It is a matter of importance not only in terms of 
international relations, but for national security. 
 
Ever since the implications of GPS interference became clear, academic studies 
have largely focussed on technical and situational aspects of jamming and 
counter-jamming technologies. These studies have focussed on the outcomes of 
specific methods which have been undertaken under careful testing conditions. 
Technical studies have provided valuable information for the 
practitioner/military community, especially in respect to risk and vulnerability 
assessments. There has also been interest in how technological changes have 
shaped the development of critical infrastructures and influenced their 
vulnerability over time.8 Whilst some organizations such as the Resilient 
Navigation and Timing Foundation, C4ADS and members have explored various 
dimensions of GPS interference, a prime focus on its wider geographical and 
geopolitical implications requires more dedicated attention. There is an 
opportunity here to explore the geopolitical context of jamming to identify 
future challenges. 
 
The aim of this article is to (1) identify the specific contexts jamming is typically 
used; (2) to identify the outcomes of the jammings, and; (3) based on these 
examples, it seeks to better comprehend the geographical and geopolitical 
implications based on likely users, their intentions, and the known ranges of 
jammers. It considers the proliferation of more oft-used low-power jamming 
devices and the use of high-powered military jammers (Table. 1). 
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Table 1. Likely Users and Distances of GPS Jammers 
Likely End-users Power Approximate 
Distance 
Privacy seekers; 
criminals 
1 deciwatt Few meters to 9.3 miles 
Organised 
criminals; 
terrorists; state 
proxy actors; 
state/private 
security actors 
1 kilowatt 31 miles 
State-assisted 
terrorist groups; 
militaries 
10 kilowatts 94 miles - 124 miles 
Notes: Collected from open-access sources.9 
 
The thesis of this article is based on the premise that, through time, the changing 
nature of war and military technology will consistently affect the “spatial 
organisation of nations and their resources.”10 It is argued here that end-user 
intentions accordant with current jamming distances means that the risk and 
vulnerability of assets, in relation to their proximity to those end-users, can be 
better comprehended. But this is complicated by the fact that small jamming 
devices are easily available and powerful jammers can be homemade or smuggled 
into territories as parts and components and then reassembled, or even projected 
from aircraft or via ships.  
 
The article first locates the jamming phenomena from a historical perspective in 
order to build a contextual understanding of its contemporary implications. 
Drawing on examples, it also seeks to identify the likely end-users and their 
intentions based on the outcomes of their activities, whether intentional or 
unintentional. Finally, it explores future geopolitical challenges in relation to the 
examples explored, based on likely end-users and the locations of critical 
infrastructure that have been previously affected. The article concludes that as 
GPS jamming is not confined to conflict zones, interference is possible in a 
variety of geographical areas. 
 
The findings were achieved by extensive literature review of online and offline 
media and governmental material. It is important to note that there is a bias 
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with the material in this article, which relies almost entirely on English language 
and Western-sourced material.  
 
Historical to Contemporary Context of the Effectiveness of Jamming 
 
Brief History of Radio Jamming 
 
The discovery and use of radio waves as a form of communication can be traced 
back to the late 19th century. The first recorded instance of intentional radio 
jamming (which was, interestingly, for commercial rather than military gains) 
was in 1901 during a yacht race in the USA.11 During World War I, radio was used 
primarily for military and maritime communications, but became increasingly 
used for propaganda purposes.12 It was not until the 1920s when radio was 
capable of distributing mass media to millions of listeners.13  
 
During the war and interwar periods of the 20th century, radio transmissions 
enabled governments and movements to transmit prohibited information and 
ideas over national borders.14 Government and military efforts to disrupt these 
transmissions evolved over time, progressively overcoming technical, financial 
and geographical hurdles. During the Cold War, for example, the Polish 
Communist regime undertook a relentless 39-year campaign of jamming 
transmissions from Radio Free Europe, placing transmitters on police stations 
and military bases. Such attempts replicated other jamming campaigns by other 
communist regimes and colonial Western powers.15 Jamming, though limited in 
radius and only effective in certain frequencies, was a large part of controlling the 
movement of information for political and military reasons. Radio broadcasting 
for propaganda purposes and jamming continues in disputed territories to this 
day. 
 
Effectiveness of Jamming Smart Weapons 
 
The launching of communication satellites, the expanded use of radio waves, and 
resultant technologies has increased the opportunities for, and the implications 
of, jamming. A probable catalyst for new jamming developments came as a result 
of the instigation of GPS in the 1970s and the miniaturization of GPS receivers in 
the 1980s. Applying GPS guidance to munitions allows the U.S. to develop 
steerable smart weapons. These weapons were more precise resulting in greater 
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efficiency and less collateral damage in military operations. 
 
During the first Gulf War, many states recognized the importance and 
versatility of GPS in modern warfare (beyond its utility in smart weapons), and 
in later years the potential of GPS jammers was becoming more marketable. 
High-power military jammers were being openly marketed at various defense 
fairs by America’s traditional adversaries.16 During the second Gulf War, Iraqi 
forces placed Russian-sourced jamming devices on buildings on or near 
important strategic targets.17 These jammers were intended to confuse cruise 
missile guidance systems, such as Boeing JDAM (Joint Direct Attack 
Munition), and Raytheon's BGM-109 Tomahawk land attack cruise missile and 
Enhanced Paveway. 
 
There have been mixed messages with regards to the effectiveness of Iraq’s 
jamming. The UK and US forces argued that the jammers proved ineffective.18 
In the short term, however, it prompted coalition forces to target the jammers 
with force and place more reliance on their laser-guided capabilities.19  
 
In the long term, more investment went into anti-spoofing and anti-jamming 
capabilities in JDAM kits (even as recently as 2011, there had been speculation 
that North Korea were able to affect South Korea’s JDAM arsenal with military 
jammers), as well as guided weapons specifically developed to locate and 
target jamming locations.20 Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense 
sought more significant investment into counter-space capabilities as a 
consequence of Iraq’s jammings.21 Indeed, the method of placing jammers on 
key infrastructures remains a contemporary mode of defense. Russia’s defense 
initiative Pole-21, for example, involves placing jammers on key domestic 
infrastructures as a precaution for possible conventional war.22 Therefore, 
whilst the effectiveness of jamming smart weapons is not entirely clear from 
open-access sources, it certainly affected military strategy and had a political 
and financial impact in years that followed. For military strategists, precision 
bombings are simply more likely to be successful in locations where jammers 
are not situated, hence the geographical and geopolitical factors are influenced 
by strategic alliances, defense acquisitions, end-user intentions, and owners of 
jammers. 
 
Military Jamming and Spoofing Civil and Military Aviation and Shipping  
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Apart from potentially disorienting smart weapons, jamming has been used to 
make surveillance and targeting methods more difficult. GPS jamming, for 
example, was used thwart the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in 
2018. The Mission reported severe jamming of its long-range UAV, which was 
observing compliance with the latest ceasefire agreed by fighting parties. The 
jamming “caused most of the control and communication links (including 
backup systems) between the Ground Control Station and the UAV to fail.”23 
In 2016, the Mission had lost a long-range UAV in the same area, over Korsun.  
 
Like in smart weapons, the miniaturization of lightweight antenna systems is 
useful for UAVs with low payload capacities. As well as affecting communication 
links, spoofing can impact their coordinates. In 2011, Iran spoofed and captured a 
U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel UAV by redirecting it to land inside Iranian borders.24 
Adding to the embarrassment of the Obama administration, Iran subsequently 
accused the U.S. of spying within Iranian airspace and have reportedly attempted 
to reverse-engineer the design of the UAV.  
 
China has reportedly used GPS jamming against its neighbors and against U.S. 
forces in the Asia-Pacific region, in light of contentious issues over the its 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Amongst other coordinated cyber-
attacks, there were also reports that China “attempted to interfere with U.S. 
military drones at least once in recent years…conducting surveillance missions in 
the Spratly Islands.”25 
 
In the ongoing civil war in Syria, where jamming is commonplace, U.S. 
surveillance UAVs and AC-130 gunships have been affected by jamming and 
spoofing.26 Whilst it has not been disclosed how the gunships have been affected, 
it was stressed that the jamming of communication systems and data links 
between AC-130 crews, special forces and supporting conventional forces could 
affect the process of establishing the location and positive identification of 
targets. Even with electro-optically or infrared-enhanced visual aids, jamming 
GPS location information can make it harder for AC-130 crews to differentiate 
between friendly/hostile forces and civilians, especially in close combat 
situations.27  
 
In the same region, Pyongyang has targeted military and civil air and naval 
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traffic near the demilitarized zone with Russian-designed military jammers on 
more than 100 occasions. This jamming reportedly affected over 1000 civilian 
aircraft (as well as South Korean military aircraft), hundreds of fishing vessels, 
cell phone services, and car navigation systems, targeting infrastructure 
separately and systematically.28  
 
What is unique about North Korea’s military jamming is that it is done with full 
knowledge of the consequences to civilian operations, and therefore intended for 
harassment and possible economic damage. Indeed, in 2012, one jamming 
campaign aimed at the South Korean capital lasted more than two weeks.29 This 
length of time is unparalleled elsewhere in civilian areas. 
 
A similar theme is identified in Europe. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs confronted Russian authorities over concerns that civilian aviation and 
communications systems had been repeatedly ‘jammed in connection with 
nearby Russian military activities’ near Norway’s Eastern Finnmark region.30 On 
one occasion, in September 2017, airliners SAS and Widerøe ‘had to navigate 
with the help of radio signals due to loss of GPS when they entered the East 
Finnmark airspace.’31 Similar instances have occurred in other European 
countries bordering Russia. 
 
Impacts and Potential Repercussions 
 
Based on the above examples, military GPS jamming is used as a combined 
attrition of an enemy’s communications, target accuracy, surveillance 
capabilities, and navigational reliability. GPS jamming can significantly affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and impact morale. It is also used 
offensively and politically for harassment and intimidation in disputed territories 
or near military training exercises. The impact of jamming and spoofing have 
different consequences, but the potential impacts and repercussions are here 
discussed in more detail. 
 
In both the South Korea and Norway examples, whilst it was speculated that 
South Korea’s JDAM capabilities were affected, the aircraft and ships in both 
countries were able to switch to their backup inertial navigation systems (INS) 
and other ground-based systems. In Seoul, much of the jamming signals were 
blocked by buildings and hills, and generally caused more of a ‘nuisance more 
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than a threat.’32 In Norway, there were no reports of widespread problems in 
urban centres. 
 
Nevertheless, whilst the impacts have been reported as relatively negligible, the 
consequences of jamming in metropolitan areas could be much more serious if 
the jamming persists over a number of days. North Korea’s lengthy 2012 
jamming campaign extended the period of inconvenience for civil users, 
magnifying the frustration of the population and therefore placing more pressure 
on the South to take action. Instead of taking military action (of which the 
outcome would be catastrophic), the South protested to the United Nations.  
 
It can be assumed that Russia, North Korea, and China jam neighbouring 
countries knowing that lethal retaliation is extremely unlikely, making jamming a 
low-risk, high-reward option if provocation is the intention. Intentional jamming 
of civilian areas has so far not led to any significant issues beyond scoring 
relatively obscure political gains. But there is the potential for the escalation of 
conflict and of causing serious vehicle accidents. 
 
On this point, one of the most concerning issues relating to jamming or spoofing 
aircraft or ships are in cases where users are not aware that they are receiving 
inaccurate navigation and location data. Reports of jamming in the Black Sea, 
which affected the situational awareness of some 20 ships (reporting that the 
location of the vessels were 20 miles inland), would present obvious inaccuracies 
that could be quickly rectified.33 In situations where momentary disorientation is 
caused, this could prove catastrophic. Indiscriminate jammings of ships in the 
Korean Peninsula was largely negligible as ships had alternative navigation 
systems and methods. But momentary and targeted GPS jamming can affect 
systems such as automatic identification systems (AIS) which normally use GPS 
receivers. Research by the University of Nottingham and the Royal Norwegian 
Naval Academy confirmed that jammers could momentarily affect the positioning 
data of ships of up to 10 meters which, they stressed, could be very hazardous in 
narrow, busy straits.34 Validating these tests, in one real-world example, 
momentary GPS interference was considered a likely cause of two large ships 
colliding in Germany's busy Kiel Firth waterway.35   
 
In the case of Iran’s spoofing of the US UAV, the act of misdirecting aircraft or 
ships into unauthorized airspaces and territories adds weight to the concern that 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss2/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.2.1720
9 
spoofing or momentary disorientation of positioning data could escalate tensions 
much more than practice of indiscriminately jamming of civilian areas, ships and 
aircraft. Indeed, former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney stated that he supported 
the option of targeting the captured UAV in Iran immediately with airstrikes 
(former President Barack Obama decided instead to request the return of the 
UAV).36 It is highly unlikely that Iran’s intentions was to provoke the U.S. into an 
armed response, but the outcome of their actions could have had major 
consequences.  
 
It is a dark irony that Russia’s downing of the Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983 
after it accidentally flew into its territory led to Ronald Reagan’s executive order 
allowing civilian access to GPS. But it is a reminder that loss of location could be 
exploited by a range of actors with malign intentions, and that reliance on GPS is 
not an answer but rather a useful but fragile invention that is exploitable.
 
 
The Use and Impact of Small Jamming Devices 
 
There are rising concerns about the widespread acquisition and use of small 
pocket-sized ‘privacy seeking’ jamming devices, as well as the potential of home-
made jamming devices. Privacy seeking jammers are typically used by drivers in 
the freight industry to stop their managers tracking their location, and can be 
bought for less than $100 online. These small jamming devices cover a jamming 
distance of a few meters to as far as 9 miles.37 They are significantly more difficult 
to detect and locate than powerful military devices. 
 
Whilst more “determined” groups, such as organized criminal gangs and 
terrorists, may have the means to produce and acquire more powerful jamming 
devices than those used by privacy seekers, it is still argued by some critics that it 
would take significant mastery of GPS technology to bring “apocalyptic visions of 
a cyber-hell” to life, as argued by cyber specialist Martyn Thomas.38 However, the 
widespread use of jamming devices that are intended for privacy indiscriminately 
and unintentionally affect other services that rely on GPS. 
 
Unintentional jamming with low-power devices has disrupted air travel and 
financial transactions on frequent occasions in the U.K. and the United States. 
For example, the London Stock Exchange, which relies on precision timing for 
financial transactions, has been subject to repeated GPS outages, and many users 
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have not been identified or prosecuted.39 In July 27, 2013, it was recorded that 
time stamps on the financial trade in the London Stock Exchange were affected 
and navigation systems in cars ‘stopped working.’ It was determined that the 
offender was a delivery driver hiding from his management.40 
 
Such events have arguably opened Pandora’s box in terms of potentially inviting 
criminals and state actors to exploit this weakness, recognizing not only that time 
manipulation can disrupt a nation’s economy (by scaring away market 
participants or putting domestic traders at significant disadvantages), but this 
can be achieved with small devices without being quickly detected. Indeed, it has 
been argued by one specialist that spoofing could create ‘opportunities for ill-
gotten gains and disruptions like the 2010 ‘flash crash.’41  
 
It is also feared that these deliberate disruptions could be combined with other 
types of electronic and cyber-attacks.42 For example, if jamming alone is 
undertaken by numerous individuals in one urban location, the time it would 
take to locate and stop them could be considerable. Likewise, there have been 
many raised concerns about how devices—whether single powerful device or 
multiple devices used systematically—could cause a serious shipping accident 
in areas like the English Channel, the world’s busiest seaway.43  
 
Theoretically, in the event of conflict between two or more adversaries, the 
combined use of military and low-power ‘civilian’ devices could cause significant 
disruption. China—a country where small jamming devices are mass-produced—
has the industrial-base to produce and distribute high quantities of such devices. 
Socio-technical changes may also increase the incentive to buy jamming devices 
by civilian users; for example, GPS-enabled tracking, toll collection (notably in 
Germany), and even gaming trends (Pokémon Go), has seen increased use of 
small jamming devices.  
 
Geographies of Jamming 
 
Unlike cyber-crime which has no limitations in terms of ranges, GPS jamming 
and spoofing can only be achieved within a minimum of a few meters to a 
maximum of over 100 miles. In practice, this puts critical infrastructures and 
other assets in certain geographical locations in more danger than others. 
Indeed, during World War II, the westernmost and northernmost industries in 
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Germany and the southernmost and easternmost industries in England were 
targeted significantly more than industries at opposite ends. This was based on 
capable distances and payload capacities of aerial bombers. In hindsight, should 
infrastructure managers and military planners consider proactively the 
geographical locations of assets in relation to known military jamming 
capabilities and likely end-users? Should GPS reliance be reduced and should 
more investment into counter-jamming technologies be invested in these 
locations? 
 
There are, of course, predictable instances where jamming is a possibility. GPS-
reliant military systems such as UAVs used in conflict zones or near borders of 
‘enemy’ states are vulnerable to jamming and spoofing. The interference of 
civilian systems will likely be affected if within similar proximities of military 
jammers. North Korea’s jamming in 2012, for example, was traced to the town 
of Kaesong, just over the border.44 South Korea’s Incheon International Airport, 
one of the busiest airports in the world, which serves the greater Seoul 
metropolitan area, is only 23 miles from the demilitarized zone. The 
metropolitan area of Seoul is approximately 60 miles from the demilitarized 
zone. Counter-jamming technologies should therefore be refined to these areas 
in practice. Governments of countries whose populations are likely to be 
affected by electronic warfare methods will have sufficiently more pressure 
weighed on them to take action.  
 
Understanding a states’ strategic calculus of using electronic warfare as means 
of harassment and intimidation over borders will also inform risk and 
vulnerability assessments. Russia's Zapad military drills, involving thousands of 
soldiers, are carried out as far as 10km from Norway.62 Finland have also 
experienced jamming from Russian military exercises. This could be tied to 
Norway’s hosting of NATO Exercise Trident Juncture 2018 and the latter’s 
involvement. Only diplomatic approaches to persuade Russia to practice its 
jamming capabilities out of reach of bordering infrastructures is the least 
aggravating approach. 
 
There is, however, the issue of complacency if vulnerability assessments are 
confined to critical infrastructures near adjacent borders. There is always the 
possibility that military jammers target locations from ships or aircraft or 
smuggled into territories as parts and components and reassembled. The use of 
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privacy seeking devices further complicates this matter. It is unrealistic for 
critical infrastructure managers, particularly in dense urban locations (such as 
the financial district of London) to create physical stand-off distances sufficient 
to mitigate against interference.  
 
Since the manufacture, trade and use of privacy seeking jammers has increased, 
the geographical and geopolitical implications of critical infrastructure 
protection have become more complex. Not only does jamming occur in conflict 
zones and over territories, it already takes place in domestic locations. GPS 
interference is, therefore, no longer confined to conflict zones or adjacent 
territories, but prevails as an issue possible in all locations.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Since radio waves were utilized to relay information, so has the incentive of those 
to disrupt that process. Since the introduction of GPS, jamming methods and 
intentions have evolved at pace with developments in military technologies and 
systems. Jamming has adapted from obstructing communications to affecting 
target accuracy, surveillance capabilities, and navigational reliability. As an 
offensive measure, it has been used almost entirely for harassment and 
intimidation, affecting GPS-reliant systems in both military and civilian realms. 
Overall, the practice of jamming has become potentially deadlier as reliance on 
GPS has increased. 
 
Whilst technical studies are extremely useful, they often do not explore the 
geographical and geopolitical implications of jamming and spoofing in sufficient 
depth. Based on the findings, it is unclear if jamming and disorientating smart 
weapons by placing jammers on targeted buildings is effective, but Russia’s Pole-
21 initiative demonstrates that it is a mode of defense that is considered to this 
day. For military strategists, precision bombings are simply more likely to be 
successful in locations where jammers are not situated, hence the geographical 
and geopolitical factors are influenced by strategic alliances, defense acquisitions, 
end-user intentions, and owners of jammers. 
 
States have targeted UAVs and military aircraft with some success in Ukraine, 
Syria, and Afghanistan. North Korea and Russia are using electronic warfare 
frequently as a mode of harassment into civilian areas. If jamming occurs in 
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civilian areas for extended periods, this could place more pressure on countries to 
respond with force (at the extreme end of the scale) but so far, such incidents 
have been pursued diplomatically. Governments of countries whose populations 
are likely to be affected by electronic warfare methods will have sufficiently more 
pressure weighed on them to take action.  
 
The impact of indiscriminate jamming of ships and planes has been largely 
negligible, as they typically have backup navigation systems. But momentary 
disruption has proven to be extremely hazardous in situations where collisions 
could occur. Not only is this a threat to life but can provoke conflict. In the case of 
Iran’s spoofing of the US UAV, the act of misdirecting aircraft or ships into 
unauthorized airspaces and territories adds weight to the concern that spoofing 
or momentary disorientation of positioning data could escalate tensions much 
more than practice of indiscriminately jamming civilian areas, including ships 
and aircraft.  
 
The proliferation of small privacy seeking devices has grown considerably since 
tracking, toll collection, gaming trends and other GPS-reliant systems have 
emerged. Frequent interruptions to aircraft and the financial sector could be 
further exploited by criminal, terrorists, proxy state actors in numerous ways. 
GPS jamming is therefore no longer confined to conflict zones, it is a present 
threat to domestic infrastructures. 
 
Overall, the geographical position of a national territory and of its key 
infrastructures in relation to likely end-users should influence the perception of a 
countries’ defense needs.44 But this is further complicated by the fact that the 
proliferation of jamming devices - which can be made at home or acquired 
online, or projected from aircraft or ships - means that jamming ranges should 
form only part of risk and vulnerability assessments. 
 
There are, however, predictable instances where jamming is always a possibility: 
In disputed territories, conflicts, and close to unfriendly borders. Likewise, 
indiscriminate jammings in civilian areas may occur if military jamming is used 
in self-defense in neighbouring countries. But military drills, like in Russia, which 
could be practically undertaken away from adjacent territories, are intentionally 
provocative. Overall, the vulnerability and proximity of infrastructure should be 
considered in relation to the strategic intentions of neighbouring states. 
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In the near future, military jamming will continue to be used as a form of 
harassment in civilian areas, mostly in relatively short bursts that are less likely 
to provoke an armed response. In distant future, as long as military systems rely 
on GPS, electronic warfare will continue to be used in conflict to affect 
communications, target accuracy, surveillance capabilities, and navigational 
reliability. The success and efficiency of military operations will depend on the 
enduring capability race between those involved in the research, development, 
manufacture, trade in and use of jamming and counter-jamming technologies. 
 
In order to develop our understanding of the possibilities and implications of 
jamming, further research is required into the geographical implications of the 
manufacture, trade in, and use of jamming devices as well as the possibilities of 
their parts and components being smuggled and assembled in countries. More 
research also is required into the socio-technical forces driving the demand for 
different types of jammers, in particular the relationships between GPS reliance 
and the forces that want to exploit that reliance.  
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